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Japanese Management Views on Overseas Exchange
Listings: Survey Results
Abstract
Previous empirical studies cast a doubt on a positive effect of overseas listings on stockholders’
wealth. We should investigate reasons for the steady growth of overseas listings other than the
stockholders’ wealth  maximization. However, we have little information about management
views on overseas listings except regarding U.S. firms. In this paper, we used a mail
questionnaire to obtain information on overseas listing decisions of Japanese companies. As our
survey shows, Japanese managers regard the disclosure and financial reporting requirements as
the primary obstacles to overseas listings. This is why many Japanese companies do not list their
stocks on overseas stock exchanges in spite of the fact that they acknowledge the beneficial
effects of overseas listings.
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I. Introduction
Japanese listed firms can be classified into three categories by their listing status. First,
there are many firms that list on a single domestic stock exchange. Second, there are many firms
that list on two or more domestic stock exchanges. In Japan, there are eight stock exchanges (i.e.,
Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Niigata, and Sapporo). At the end of 1996,
among 2334 listed firms, 1230 firms listed their stocks on only one stock exchange, 599 on two
stock exchanges, 269 on three stock exchanges, and 209 on four or more stock exchanges.
The third category of listing status is the so-called international dual listings or overseas
dual listings. Since the late 1980’s, there has been a steady increase in the number of Japanese
overseas listed firms. At the end of 1995, 121 Japanese corporations had listed their stocks on
overseas stock exchanges. Of these, fifty-nine Japanese companies listed their stocks on the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange and thirty on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) at  that time (See
Table 1). However, the fact that there were only a few Japanese firms listing their stocks on the
NYSE, the largest stock market in the world, is surprising, considering the large scale of the U.S.
and Japanese economies and the close economic relationship between the United States and
Japan. In fact, at the end of 1995, only ten Japanese companies (e.g., Hitachi, Sony, and Honda)
listed their stocks on the NYSE, while thirty-six U.K. companies listed on the NYSE.
Of course, deciding to list overseas is a corporate financial decision. The research
question is why domestically-listed firms want overseas listings. Saudagaran (1988) and Biddle
and Saudagaran (1991), among others (e.g., Mittoo, 1994; Howe and Kelm, 1987), pointed out
that overseas listings are expected to have financial benefits, marketing and public relations
benefits, political benefits, and employee relations benefits.2
In particular, there are many theoretical and empirical studies dealing  with the financial
benefits of international listings. As theoretically shown by Alexander et. al. (1987), if domestic
capital markets are segmented from foreign markets, financial theory predicts positive effects of
overseas listings on stockholders’ wealth. However, in spite of the integration of financial
markets that has occurred since the 1980’s and that has made it possible for investors to invest
overseas directly, many firms have listed on foreign stock exchanges. This fact may suggest that
domestic markets are still segmented from foreign markets.
There are several empirical studies that have investigated the effects of overseas listings
on stockholders’ wealth. Howe and Kelm (1987), using the event-study-type method, found that
overseas listings of U.S. companies on the Basel, Frankfurt, Paris, or Tokyo Stock Exchanges
had a negative impact on stockholders’ wealth, while Lee (1991) found that overseas listings of
U.S. companies on the London or  Toronto Stock Exchanges had no substantial impact on
stockholders’ wealth.
Fry et al. (1994) also investigated the listing of U.S. firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
and found that it had no substantial impact on stockholders’ wealth. On the other hand,
Alexander et al. (1988), investigating the non-U.S. companies’ listings on the U.S. stock
exchanges (including NASDAQ), found that overseas listings had a positive impact on
stockholders’ wealth. Therefore, as Lau et al.(1994) pointed out, previous research in the area of
international stock exchange listings has documented mixed evidence regarding the valuation
impact of overseas listings.
1 It may be fair to say that the effects of overseas listings may depend
on the countries, stock exchanges, and economic environments.
                                                
1  Also, previous studies (e.g., Khan et al.[1993]), investigating the wealth effect of domestic listing of U.S. firms,
found that domestic listing did not enhance the stockholders’ wealth.3
Thus, we can guess that overseas listings  are decided not only due to stockholders’
wealth maximization but also due to other management considerations. In this respect, it is very
interesting to investigate the case of Japanese firms, because intercorporate shareholdings,
keiretsu, and the main bank system in Japan give Japanese managers larger freedom of
management than their counterparts in many other countries (e.g., Aoki and Patrick, 1994).
Therefore, in terms of Japanese firms, the managerial perceptions of exchange listing  are
expected to be the most important factor in deciding whether the firms list abroad or not.
Although Baker and Pettit (1982), Freeman and Rosenbaum (1987), Baker and Johnson
(1990), and Baker and Khan (1993) among others used a mail questionnaire and obtained
valuable information regarding management’s motives for domestic exchange listings of U.S.
companies, we have little information regarding management views on  overseas listing of
Japanese companies. In this paper, following  Baker and Pettit (1982) and Baker and Johnson
(1990), we used a mail questionnaire to obtain relevant information on overseas listing decisions
of Japanese companies. Our survey study is useful because there are very few studies that
examine management views on overseas listings regarding non-U.S. firms, even though dual
international listings are becoming increasingly popular. As far as we know, only Mitto (1992),
which focused on Canadian firms that listed abroad, exists. This paper is a first attempt for
Japanese firms and a second attempt for non-U.S. firms.
Also, studying Japanese firms is important because Japanese firms are the largest players
in the international financial markets. For example, according to Morgan Stanley Capital
International Perspective, three of the six largest companies, ranked by market capitalization as
of July 31, 1996, are Japanese firms (i.e., NTT [the third], Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi [the fifth],4
and Toyota Motor [the sixth]). Although there are 16 Japanese firms within the top 80, only three
firms list their stocks on the NYSE.
Saudagaran and  Biddle (1992, 1995) found evidence suggesting that  foreign listing
locations are significantly influenced by  financial disclosure levels.  Also, based on a survey
research, Choi and Levich (1990) concluded that accounting differences are important and affect
the capital market decisions of a significant number of market participants, regardless of
nationality, size, experience, scope of international activity, or organization structure. According
to the results of a disclosure level survey conducted by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992, 1995)
shown in Table 2, the Japanese disclosure standard is ranked as the sixth out of eight countries.
Thus, Japanese firms may face difficulty in satisfying foreign accounting rules and disclosure
requirements. In fact, in interviews with company officials in Japan, Choi and Stonehill (1982)
found that the Japanese officials’ attitudes toward stock exchange listing were generally positive
but that  the SEC regulations (e.g., the timing of filing requirements and financial disclosure
requirements) were perceived as the major obstacle to their access to the U.S. market. As Choi
and Stonehill (1982) was written more than 15 years ago and there have been many regulatory
changes in Japan, it is pertinent to examine whether Japanese firms still hesitate to list their
stocks on foreign stock exchange due to different financial disclosure levels.
II.  Survey Methodology
Following Baker and Pettit (1982), Baker and Johnson (1990), Baker and Khan (1993),
and Mittoo (1992), we used the mail questionnaire to examine management views of Japanese
companies on overseas listings. However, these previous studies except Mittoo (1992) dealt only
with domestic listings. Here, based on Saudagaran (1990), which surveyed the costs and benefits5
of overseas listings, we constructed our questionnaire to elicit managers’ opinions on 27
statements about overseas exchange listings, which are shown in Table 5.
2 We can classify these
statements into two major groups. First, the statements from (b) to (u) are related to the
beneficial effects of overseas listings. Second, the statements from (v) to (za) are related to the
cost-related effects of overseas listings.
Respondents were asked to judge each statement by choosing a number on a seven-point
scale: -3 = strongly disagree, -2 = moderately disagree, -1 = slightly disagree, 0 = no opinion, +1
= slightly agree, +2 = moderately agree, and +3 = strongly agree.
We chose our sample as follows. First, based on several issues of the Quarterly Nikkei
Company Handbook published by Nihon Keizai Shinbun, we found that 121 domestically-listed
Japanese companies had listed their stocks on overseas stock exchanges before 1996. We call
these dual overseas listed companies “OSL companies” for simplicity.
3
Also, to compare the results of the OSL companies, we sent a similar questionnaire to
companies which listed their stocks on Japanese stock exchanges but not on overseas stock
exchanges.
4 There were 2109 non-overseas listed companies, which we abbreviate as “NOL”
companies.
We sent the questionnaire to the chief financial officers of 2230 Japanese companies on
May 20, 1996. Using the 1996 Yakuin Quarterly (a list of names of board members of Japanese
                                                
2  The original questionnaire and all responses were written in Japanese. To write this paper, the authors translated
the questionnaire into English.
3  Five companies started to list their stocks on overseas stock exchanges after 1994. As we wanted respondents
with substantial experience in the foreign stock exchanges, we sent a questionnaire for the non-overseas listed
companies to these five companies. Of the five, only NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone; the largest
company in Japan) responded, and it asked us to send the questionnaire for the overseas listed companies.
Therefore, we sent it, and received NTT’s response. We included NTT in the OSL sample. However, the results
do not change whether NTT is included in either the OSL or NOL sample.
4  In addition to the 27 statements, the questionnaire sent to the OSL companies also asked a few supplementary
questions such as “when were the stocks listed on overseas stock exchanges?”6
listed companies) published by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, we looked for a director who was in
charge of the listing decision or financial management.  However, we sometimes could not
specify that person, in which case we sent a questionnaire to a director in charge of general
affairs or the president of the company, with a letter asking that the questionnaire be directed to
the person in charge of the listing decision.
III.  Results
(1)  Characteristics of the Respondent Firms
The survey’s total response rate was 17.2 percent (384 firms). The group-specific
response rate was 38.8 percent (47 firms) of the OSL companies and 16.0 percent (337 firms) of
the NOL companies.
Table 3 presents the respondent ratio for each group by industry. It shows that the
respondents represent a variety of businesses. Table 4 classifies respondent firms by the size of
capital stocks. Both large and small firms are well represented.
(2)  Overseas listed companies
Table 5 presents the number of firms which chose each score, the mean (µ) of judgments
by the managers of the OSL companies, its standard deviation ( s) and the Z score, which is
defined as Z=µ/(s/n
0.5). Here, n is the number of responses. Table 5 also displays two kinds of
ranking, based on the respective mean and Z score for each of the twenty-seven statements in our
questionnaire. The means reflect the degree to which representative respondents agree to the
statement, and the Z scores are used to test the null hypothesis that the mean is zero. Using the
5% critical value (1.960), we find that the respondents agreed with twenty statements. When the7
null hypothesis is changed to a mean smaller than 0.5, the null hypothesis can be rejected for
nine statements.
As shown in Table 5, statement (s), “Overseas listings increase a company’s prestige and
visibility in the host country,” obtains the highest Z score (12.222) as well as the highest mean
(1.362). This result is consistent with Baker and Johnson (1990), which found that U.S.
managers commonly agreed that listing increases a company’s visibility and enhances its
prestige. Statement (h), “Overseas listings increase foreign stockholders,” obtains the second-
highest Z score (9.291). Statements (t) and (i) follow. Although statement (k), “Overseas listings
ease a firm’s task of obtaining future external financing,” obtains the second-highest mean
(1.022), it is fifth in the Z score ranking because of its large standard error.
 Statements from (c) to (g) are related to stock price effects of overseas listings. All
statements have insignificant Z scores. As shown by the low Z scores of these statements, it is
clear that Japanese managers think that stock price effects of overseas listings are negligible.
These results are consistent with the results of Baker and Pettit (1982), which found that U.S.
managers did not believe domestic exchange listings influenced prices, and those of Lee (1992),
which found no significant wealth effect derived from  Japanese firms’ listings on the London
Stock Exchange.
Statements from (h) to (j) deal with the company’s investor base. As these three
statements are ranked highly, the majority of respondents apparently agree that overseas listings
broaden foreign individual and institutional  stockholder bases. Statements from (k) to (n) deal
with the effects of overseas listings on financing. It is apparent that Japanese managers expect
overseas listings to favorably affect financing. However, as shown by response to statement (m),
it is notable that managers do not strongly expect overseas listings to reduce the cost of capital.8
This is perfectly consistent with the above-mentioned responses to statements (c) through (g). In
this regard, managers do not believe the argument of Eun and Janakiramanan (1990), which
concluded that dual overseas listings reduced the cost of capital, while this result is consistent
with Baker and Pettit (1982), which reported that managers of NYSE listed companies did not
expect cost-reducing effects from a single domestic listing.
Statements from (v) to (za) deal with the cost-related effects of overseas listings. All
statements except Statement (za) have significant Z scores. Statement (y), “Greater frequency of
financial reporting and more extensive financial disclosure are costly,” obtains the highest mean
(1.000) among six cost-related statements. This is consistent with Biddle and Saudagaran (1989),
Saudagaran (1990), and Saudagaran and Biddle (1992, 1995) which showed that companies
tended to list on exchanges with less severe disclosure requirements than domestic ones.
Statement (z), “Monetary costs and executive time commitment to foreign investor relations are
costly,” obtains the second-highest mean and statement (x),  “Adjustment of accounting and
auditing standards to meet foreign requirements is costly,” ranks third.
(3)  Comparison with Canadian firms
As far as we know, only Mittoo (1992) has examined management views on overseas
listings regarding non-U.S. firms. Specifically, Mittoo (1992) focused on Canadian firms that
listed in the United States and United Kingdom as of May 1991. There are two important
differences between Canadian firms and Japanese firms in terms of international listings. First,
the Canadian disclosure requirement is as stringent as that of the United States, while the
Japanese disclosure requirement is more modest  than either of them. Second, the Canadian
capital market is smaller than the Japanese market.9
Therefore, it is interesting to compare Japanese firms with Canadian firms. Our
questionnaire is not exactly the same as what Mittoo used, but we can find statements that
correspond in both questionnaires.
According to Mittoo, for Canadian firms, the top three benefits of foreign listings are, in
order, access to foreign capital markets, growth of shareholder base, and increased visibility and
liquidity. These benefits are also ranked as the top three by Japanese firms, although in their
case, the number one is increased visibility. On the cost side, both Canadian firms and Japanese
firms perceived the disclosure requirement as the most important cost. Therefore, although the
regulatory and economic environments of Japan and Canada are different from each other, the
perceived benefits and costs of international listing are very similar.
(4)  NYSE listed firms and other OSL firms
We divided the OSL sample into NYSE listed firms (including only four firms) and non-
NYSE-listed firms, and compared the scores of these samples. We found that there were two
statistically significantly different scores. The first difference appears in responses to Statement
(m). That is, non-NYSE listed firms agree more strongly to the statement that overseas listings
reduced a firm’s cost of equity capital than NYSE listed firms.
The second difference  is found with Statement (w),  “Recurring monetary costs of
compliance with foreign regulations are costly.” The non-NYSE listed firms acknowledge the
beneficial effects of listing on the NYSE, the largest capital market in the world, but they
consider the recurring monetary costs of compliance with U.S. regulations to be very expensive,
while companies listed there perceive the costs as relatively less expensive.10
(5)  Comparison with non-overseas listed companies
Table 6 shows the mean and standard deviation of responses from managers of non-
overseas companies (NOL) as well as the Z score. Here, because of the large sample size, all of
the means have highly significant Z scores.
Among  statements (b) through (u), statement (h),  “Overseas listings increase foreign
stockholders,” obtains the highest mean (1.702) as well as the highest Z score (34.359).
Statement (q), “Overseas listings ease a firm’s task of performing M&A abroad,” obtains the
second-highest mean. Statement (j), “Overseas listings appeal to foreign institutional investors,”
ranks third.
Statements (x), (y), and (z) are the largest three of the six cost-related statements based
on either means or Z scores. These statements are ranked respectively as the first, second, and
fifth based on their means. When we test the null hypothesis for a mean of 1.5, we can reject it
for statements (x) and (y), whose Z values are 4.392 and 5.033, respectively. That is, the
managers of the NOL companies regard the compliance with foreign accounting rules and
disclosure requirements as a primary obstacle to their overseas listings.
Table 7 shows the t statistics for the null hypothesis that the mean of the OSL companies
regarding each statement is equal to that of the NOL companies. It is very clear that the means of
the NOL companies for 17 statements are significantly greater than those of the OSL companies.
In other words, the NOL companies tend to overestimate both benefits and costs of overseas
listings. These differences may be due to their differing international business experiences and
familiarity with foreign capital markets.
Although the absolute scores of the OSL and the NOL companies are often significantly
different, the relative rankings for 27 of the statements are very similar between them. For11
example, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the corresponding means is 0.770 and the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the corresponding Z scores is 0.698, showing a statistically
significant relationship between them.  Also, the  Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
regarding the mean ranking and the Z score ranking are 0.715 and 0.669, respectively. These
statistically significant statistics show that the responses of the OSL companies are quite similar
to those of the NOL companies.
IV.  Concluding Remarks
This paper is the first attempt to obtain information about Japanese management views on
overseas stock exchange listings. Our results are consistent with previous studies, which dealt
with U.S. management views on domestic stock listing.
Japanese managers strongly believe in the favorable effect of overseas listings in terms of
increasing prestige and stockholder bases. As our survey shows, Japanese managers, particularly
of non-overseas listed companies, regard the disclosure and financial reporting requirements as
the primary obstacles to overseas listings. This is why many Japanese companies hesitate to list
their stocks on overseas stock exchanges, particularly on the NYSE, for which the disclosure and
financial reporting requirements are the strictest in the world (Saudagaran, 1988), in spite of the
fact that the companies acknowledge the beneficial effects of overseas listings.
There are several points to be further investigated. Our questionnaire was sent on May
1995. The sharp decline of the Japanese stock markets starting in 1990 and the recession during
the 1990’s might have affected the attitudes of the respondents toward stock listings. As the
listing decisions would be affected by the economic and stock market conditions, we should redo
the same survey in the near future to confirm the robustness of our results.12
Second, as previous studies found that some economic variables are related with the
perceived benefits and costs of international listings, we should investigate what firm-specific
factors affect the listing decisions of Japanese firms.
Finally, in November 1996, the Japanese government announced its financial reform
strategy, ‘the Big Bang plan.’ According to Spindle (1998a), one of the key elements of the ‘Big
Bang’ is that accounting standards will fall into line with international standards, including mark-
to-market method and consolidated accounting. The government has already started to make
domestic disclosure and financial reporting requirements consistent with international standards
in time for the beginning of the 21st century, and Japanese companies are preparing for the new
accounting rules. For instance, although Japanese companies are not required to disclose
information about their pension funds until the year 2000, several companies voluntarily
disclosed it and contributed substantial money to their pension fund to reduce its projected
shortfall (See Spindle, 1998b).
If this ‘Big Bang’ reform is successful, the primary obstacles to overseas listings for
Japanese companies will disappear. So far this international difference in disclosure requirements
restricts competition among stock exchanges.  However, if the difference disappears,
international competition among stock exchanges (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange vs. the
Tokyo Stock Exchange) to keep companies listed will become even more severe, because
Japanese firms will be able to list on any stock exchange. Therefore, changes in the accounting
rules and disclosure requirements will not only affect accounting procedures but will influence
the very structure of Japanese capital markets.21
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Table 1.  Japanese companies listed on major overseas stock exchanges
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
New York 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 11 10
London 9 10 22 27 27 28 27 27 30
Frankfurt 54 57 56 57 60 55 58 61 59
Paris 18 24 33 38 38 38 35 34 32
Brussels 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 5
Amsterdam 25 25 25 22 25 25 24 31 21
Luxembourg 46 46 NA 43 40 40 35 32 32
Zurich 8 8 11 13 16 16 16 16 16
Vienna 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Singapore 5 5 5 6 6 6 4 7 7
Toronto 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
NASDAQ 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
TOTAL 198 206 184 239 245 241 233 243 229
Note: Totals in this table are simple sums. Thus, companies that list on two or more overseas stock exchanges
are counted twice or more.
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchange.















United States 7.27 7.29 7.17 7.28 8
Canada 6.48 6.38 5.91 6.41 7
United Kingdom 5.84 5.87 6.09 6.02 6
Netherlands 4.68 4.87 4.50 4.75 5
France 4.11 4.50 1.13 4.17 4
Japan 3.82 4.04 4.22 3.83 3
Germany 3.96 3.90 1.04 3.81 2
Switzerland 2.70 2.78 3.17 2.60 1
Note: Ranks are in descending order with ‘8’ (‘1’) indicating highest (lowest) disclosure level.
Source: Saudagaran and Biddle (1992).14






























Firms 0 5 5 3 9 2 6
Companies Number of
Responses 0 2 2 2 3 0 3
Response
Rate (%)




Firms 18 164 119 126 204 74 159
Companies Number of
Responses
2 34 16 12 36 8 25
Response


































Firms 32 13 17 8 1 20 121
Companies Number of
Responses 14 3 6 6 0 6 47
Response




Firms 361 180 296 146 107 162 2109
Companies Number of
Responses 50 32 62 18 15 27 337
Response
Rate (%)
13.9 17.8 20.9 12.3 14.0 16.4 16.015
Table 4.  Respondent firms by size of capital stock.





¥100B > ¥100B NA Total
Overseas
Listed
Number of Firms 6 22 24 23 46 0 121
Companies Number of
Responses
2 5 6 12 22 0 47
Response Rate (%) 33.3 22.7 25.0 52.2 47.8 0.0 38.8
Non-Overseas
Listed
Number of Firms 1406 488 99 71 35 10 2109
Companies Number of
Responses 193 99 13 16 16 0 337
Response Rate (%) 13.7 20.3 13.1 22.5 45.7 0.0 16.016
Table 5.  Opinions of the OSL companies
score  (number of firms)




Z score Z score
rank
(a)
Overseas listings are possible
only when a company’s stock
price is high.
0 5 5 21 8 7 0 1 0.152 1.154 23 0.893 24
(b)
Overseas listings improve the
marketability and liquidity of the
firm’s stock.
0 2 4 10 18 12 0 1 0.739 1.084 11 4.624 9
(c)
Overseas listings make its stock
price more stable.
2 3 7 30 2 2 0 1 -0.283 0.981 27 -1.957 27
(d)
Overseas listings have a long-
term positive effect on its stock
price.
3 3 2 28 8 1 0 2 -0.156 1.086 25 -0.964 25
(e)
Overseas listings have a short-
term positive effect on its stock
price.
2 3 4 29 8 0 0 1 -0.174 0.950 26 -1.242 26
(f)
Overseas listings make its stock
price susceptible to foreign
affairs.
2 2 4 21 12 5 0 1 0.174 1.161 22 1.016 22
(g)
Overseas listings make its stock
traded more efficiently and priced
fairly.
2 1 4 23 13 3 0 1 0.152 1.053 24 0.979 23
(h)
Overseas listings increase
foreign stockholders. 0 0 2 6 28 10 0 1 1.000 0.730 3 9.291 2
(i)
Overseas listings increase the
absolute number of stockholders.
0 0 2 9 27 8 0 1 0.891 0.737 8 8.200 4
(j)
Overseas listings appeal to
foreign institutional investors.
0 2 1 10 21 10 2 1 0.913 1.050 6 5.897 7
(k)
Overseas listings ease a firm’s
task of obtaining future external
financing.
0 0 3 9 19 14 1 1 1.022 0.931 2 7.445 5
(l)
Overseas listings ease a firm’s
task of selling equity-related
bonds (e.g., bonds with warrant
and convertible bonds).
0 0 3 11 16 15 1 1 1.000 0.966 4 7.021 6
(m)
Overseas listings reduce a firm’s
cost of equity capital. 0 1 4 26 12 4 0 0 0.298 0.832 20 2.456 2017




Z score Z score
rank
(n)
Overseas listings convey positive
information about a firm’s future
prospects.
0 1 3 20 16 6 1 0 0.553 0.951 16 3.987 13
(o)
Overseas listings raise the
morale of the employees. 0 3 2 16 21 4 1 0 0.511 1.019 17 3.438 17
(p) Overseas listings ease a firm’s
task of hiring talented employees.
0 1 5 16 22 3 0 0 0.447 0.855 18 3.584 16
(q)
Overseas listings ease a firm’s
task of performing M&A abroad.
0 3 1 20 17 4 0 2 0.400 0.939 19 2.858 19
(r) Overseas listings increase a
company’s prestige in Japan.
1 0 3 17 19 7 0 0 0.574 0.972 14 4.049 12
(s)
Overseas listings increase a
company’s prestige and visibility
in the host country.
0 0 0 5 23 16 3 0 1.362 0.764 1 12.222 1
(t)
Overseas listings generate a
greater amount of news coverage
in the host country.
0 0 1 12 27 7 0 0 0.851 0.691 9 8.443 3
(u)
Overseas listings promote sale of
a company’s products in the host
country.
2 0 2 14 23 6 0 0 0.574 1.058 15 3.719 14
(v)
Monetary expense and
administrative effort in initial
registration are costly.
0 3 3 11 17 6 3 4 0.674 1.229 13 3.596 15
(w)
Recurring monetary costs of
compliance with foreign
regulations are costly.
0 1 2 16 16 8 1 3 0.705 0.978 12 4.782 8
(x)
Adjustment of accounting and
auditing standards to meet
foreign requirements is costly.
2 3 3 9 12 9 7 2 0.800 1.618 10 3.317 18
(y)
Greater frequency of financial
reporting and more extensive
financial disclosure are costly.
1 5 1 6 12 13 7 2 1.000 1.595 5 4.206 11
(z)
Monetary costs and executive
time commitment to foreign
investor relations are costly.
1 1 4 8 17 9 5 2 0.911 1.328 7 4.602 10
(za)
Increased difficulty in managing
the general meeting of
stockholders incurs higher costs.
1 1 4 27 7 2 2 3 0.182 1.063 21 1.136 2118
Table 6. Opinions of the NOL companies
score (number of firms)








Overseas listings are possible
only when a company’s stock
price is high.
7 20 36 137 76 49 11 1 0.327 1.239 25 4.838 25
(b)
Overseas listings improve the
marketability and liquidity of the
firm’s stock.
0 4 5 47 118 136 27 0 1.359 0.950 9 26.261 8
(c) Overseas listings make its stock
price more stable.
13 29 71 180 36 4 3 1 -0.342 1.013 27 -6.189 27
(d)
Overseas listings have a long-
term positive effect on its stock
price.
5 8 21 212 68 17 5 1 0.193 0.892 26 3.966 26
(e)
Overseas listings have a short-
term positive effect on its stock
price.
0 8 12 171 104 34 5 3 0.476 0.872 22 9.976 22
(f)
Overseas listings make its stock
price susceptible to foreign
affairs.
0 3 13 69 150 79 22 1 1.057 0.968 16 20.016 18
(g)
Overseas listings make its stock
traded more efficiently and
priced fairly.
2 10 35 163 89 26 11 1 0.336 1.018 24 6.050 24
(h) Overseas listings increase
foreign stockholders.
0 0 5 21 110 133 67 1 1.702 0.908 3 34.359 1
(i)
Overseas listings increase the
absolute number of
stockholders.
0 1 9 55 146 85 40 1 1.265 0.980 11 23.661 10
(j)
Overseas listings appeal to
foreign institutional investors. 0 1 1 26 141 125 42 1 1.530 0.842 6 33.308 2
(k)
Overseas listings ease a firm’s
task of obtaining future external
financing.
0 2 8 83 118 99 26 1 1.137 0.992 15 21.010 15
(l)
Overseas listings ease a firm’s
task of selling equity-related
bonds (e.g., bonds with warrant
and convertible bonds).
1 3 7 72 122 105 25 2 1.167 1.007 13 21.211 14
(m)
Overseas listings reduce a
firm’s cost of equity capital. 3 10 23 164 90 34 11 2 0.415 1.034 23 7.346 23
(n)
Overseas listings convey
positive information about a
firm’s future prospects.
1 3 8 137 105 62 17 4 0.790 0.993 20 14.518 20
(o) Overseas listings raise the
morale of the employees.
0 4 8 75 152 75 21 2 1.042 0.950 17 20.076 1719








 Overseas listings ease a
firm’s task of hiring talented
employees.
0 4 10 105 143 60 13 2 0.848 0.924 19 16.798 19
(q)
 Overseas listings ease a
firm’s task of performing M&A
abroad.
1 4 15 146 110 48 12 1 1.643 0.964 4 31.241 3
(r)
 Overseas listings increase a
company’s prestige in Japan. 0 0 8 90 154 64 20 1 0.994 0.891 18 20.449 16
(s)
 Overseas listings increase a
company’s prestige and
visibility in the host country.
0 0 2 40 156 103 35 1 1.384 0.849 7 29.881 6
(t)
 Overseas listings generate a
greater amount of news
coverage in the host country.
1 0 6 45 180 83 21 1 1.190 0.846 12 25.784 9
(u)
 Overseas listings promote
sale of a company’s products
in the host country.
2 5 5 139 133 42 7 4 0.652 0.894 21 13.309 21
(v)
 Monetary expense and
administrative effort in initial
registration are costly.
1 2 7 66 112 98 42 9 1.280 1.061 10 21.849 12
(w)
 Recurring monetary costs of
compliance with foreign
regulations are costly.
1 1 8 68 141 82 28 8 1.143 0.976 14 21.242 13
(x)
 Adjustment of accounting and
auditing standards to meet
foreign requirements is costly.
1 4 5 22 80 138 79 8 1.754 1.049 2 30.329 4
(y)
 Greater frequency of financial
reporting and more extensive
financial disclosure are costly.
1 5 5 22 68 141 86 9 1.799 1.076 1 30.280 5
(z)
 Monetary costs and executive
time commitment to foreign
investor relations are costly.
1 3 5 25 109 132 54 8 1.584 0.994 5 28.905 7
(za)
Increased difficulty in
managing the general meeting
of stockholders incurs higher
costs.
2 4 4 62 90 122 44 9 1.366 1.106 8 22.368 1120
Table 7.  Comparison between the OSL and the NOL
Statement t value
(a) Overseas listings are possible only when a company’s stock price is high. -0.957
(b) Overseas listings improve the marketability and liquidity of the firm’s stock. -3.690 ***
(c) Overseas listings make its stock price more stable. 0.385
(d) Overseas listings have a long-term positive effect on its stock price. -2.064 *
(e) Overseas listings have a short-term positive effect on its stock price. -4.393 ***
(f) Overseas listings make its stock price susceptible to foreign affairs. -4.929 ***
(g) Overseas listings make its stock traded more efficiently and priced fairly. -1.116
(h) Overseas listings increase foreign stockholders. -5.926 ***
(i) Overseas listings increase the absolute number of stockholders. -3.084 ***
(j) Overseas listings appeal to foreign institutional investors. -3.818 ***
(k) Overseas listings ease a firm’s task of obtaining future external financing. -0.781
(l) Overseas listings ease a firm’s task of selling equity-related bonds (e.g., bonds with
warrant and convertible bonds).
-1.095
(m) Overseas listings reduce a firm’s cost of equity capital. -0.875
(n) Overseas listings convey positive information about a firm’s future prospects. -1.588
(o) Overseas listings raise the morale of the employees. -3.374 **
(p) Overseas listings ease a firm’s task of hiring talented employees. -2.980 **
(q) Overseas listings ease a firm’s task of performing M&A abroad. -1.624
(r) Overseas listings increase a company’s prestige in Japan. -2.799 **
(s) Overseas listings increase a company’s prestige and visibility in the host country. -0.184
(t) Overseas listings generate a greater amount of news coverage in the host country. -3.062 **
(u) Overseas listings promote sale of a company’s products in the host country. -0.477
(v) Monetary expense and administrative effort in initial registration are costly. -3.086 **
(w) Recurring monetary costs of compliance with foreign regulations are costly. -2.792 **
(x) Adjustment of accounting and auditing standards to meet foreign requirements is costly. -3.845 ***
(y) Greater frequency of financial reporting and more extensive financial disclosure are costly. -3.258 **
(z) Monetary costs and executive time commitment to foreign investor relations are costly. -3.273 **
(za) Increased difficulty in managing the general meeting of stockholders incurs higher costs. -6.907 ***
Note:  * 5 % significant
** 1 % significant
*** 0.1% significant